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The Goble-Kenealy Discussion-
Two Comments
EDWARD T. FAGAN, JR.*
N MY OPINION, a commentary from the side-lines is in order at this
point in the debate currently featured in THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
between Professor Goble and Father Kenealy.
My first comment reflects my surprise that Father Kenealy, presum-
ably familiar with the viewpoints of Suarez, would depart from them
by asserting, "some [derivative principles of the natural law] do not
share at all in the certainty, universality and immutability of the funda-
mental principles." '
Admittedly, this position gives some logic to Professor Goble's re-
joinder: "Is it immutable or does it change? If it changes, then are not
the boundaries of the rule itself shifted by these variations in time, place
or situation?" 2
The sound answer to Professor Goble's question is found in Suarez. 3
Change may be recognized as either intrinsic (formal), such as when
a father ceases to be a father if he himself dies, or extrinsic (material),
as when a father ceases to be such due to the death of a son. All prin-
ciples and precepts of the natural law are immutable, according to
Suarez, because they can never suffer formal change. They are liable
to change only in the second manner, that is, to change through chang-
ing subject matter. Consequently, there are no real exceptions to the
*A.B., St. John's University (1940); I.A., Harvard University (1943); LL.B.,
University of Michigan (1947); LL.M. (1952), J.S.D. (1955), New York Univer-
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1 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
2 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 231 (July
1956).
3 As pointed out by another Jesuit, David C. Bayne, S.J., in his excellent article,
The Natural Law For Lawyers-A Primer, 5 DEPAUL L. REv. 159, 186 (1956).
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primary, secondary and derivative princi-
ples and precepts of the natural law. What
may properly be called apparent, but not
real, exceptions exist when a material
change has occurred in the circumstances
to which a principle is normally applicable.
Indeed, herein lies the flexibility of the na-
tural law, rather than its error.
My second comment is that Professor
Goble's posed "dilemma of the natural
law," seems to be based upon his and
Father Kenealy's failure to define terms.
Professor Goble has stated:
The universality and immutability of prin-
ciples of law can either be determined by
objective evidence or they cannot. If they
can be so determined, the whole body of
natural law becomes a system of empirical
law. If they cannot be so determined, then
objective evidence cannot be used to show
the validity of one system over another
claiming the same attributes. 4
Father Kenealy has stated:
The natural law is founded upon the ex-
istence of an objective moral order and
the knowability of objective truth. Quite
consistently, and necessarily, it makes ob-
jective evidence the criterion of that truth.5
4 Goble, supra note 2, at 232.
5 Kenealy, supra note 1, at 264.
Obviously both men are not in agree-
ment as to the use and meaning of the term
"objective evidence." The metaphysician,
as exemplified by Father Kenealy, thinks
that the distinctions between form and mat-
ter, act and potency, and being and essence
arise out of the world of experience and
have it as their locus. The only way to
know about being is to abstract from what
we experience. By "experience" is meant
what we sense. The rational faculties oper-
ate on this sense data, and abstract essence.
These abstractions, since they are predi-
cated upon sense data may properly be
called "objective evidence." The under-
standing so gained of things in their very
being is the basis of knowledge of natural
law principles.
On the other hand, I presume that Pro-
fessor Goble would think of "experience"
as involving sense data arranged by reason
in such a way as to enable prediction con-
cerning them. In consequence, he would
rule out the fact that knowledge as to the
being of things can be attained by means
other than faith and would content himself
with conclusions made upon observable
premises which he would call "objective
evidence."
